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Abstract: Alongside the emergence of various populisms, Brexit and other contemporary geopolitical 
events have been presented as symptomatic of a generalizing and intensifying sense of uncertainty in the 
midst of a crisis of (neo)liberalism. In this paper we describe what kind of event Brexit is becoming in the 
impasse between the UK’s EU referendum in 2016 and its anticipated exit from the EU in 2019. Based on 
108 interviews with people in the North-East of England, we trace how Brexit is variously enacted and felt 
as an end, advent, a harbinger of worse to come, non-event, disaster, and betrayed promise. By following 
how these incommensurate versions of Brexit take form and co-exist we supplement explanatory and 
predictive approaches to the geographies of Brexit and exemplify an approach that traces what such 
geopolitical events become. Specifically, we use the concept of ‘modes of uncertainty’ as a way of 
discerning patterns in how present uncertainties are lived. A ‘mode of uncertainty’ is a shared set of 
practices animated by a distinctive mood through which futures are made present and felt. Rather than 
treat uncertainty as a static, explanatory context, we thus follow how different versions of Brexit are 
constituted through specific ‘modes of (un)certainty’ – negative hope, national optimisms, apprehensive 
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PROLOGUE: IN AN IMPASSE 
Jane was “dismayed” by the result. She’d gone downstairs to watch the news after texting her 
sister in Sweden, something that she wouldn’t normally do unless it was serious and couldn’t 
remember ever feeling that unhappy “without it being a personal… or family thing”. For Jane, a 
retired grandmother in her 70s, “it was that emotional… as if something bad had happened in 
the family”. Her observed rise in racism and the expression of far-right views had “shaken her 
faith in humanity”. She was worried for her children and grandchildren, and “what sort of a 
world it’s going to be for them”. Jane’s hope was that Brexit wouldn’t “be as bad as it seems it 
could be” but she feels that her generation have let younger generations down.  
 
Whilst Jane hadn’t been shocked by the result Sally had been “surprised”, despite voting to leave. 
Her surprise had quickly given way to another feeling: that ‘this might be what we need…’, that 
we should “GO FOR IT”! She hadn’t liked the way the country had been going for a while and 
had been relieved to get a Conservative government in the last election. Despite feeling that 
Brexit was “absolutely” the right thing to do for the country, she recognised that it was likely to 
be “a bumpy time” but was sure: “we can weather the storm… in the end it will be to the good”. 
Sensing that ‘the mood in the country might be changing’ she expected things to be better for 
her grandchildren. Now in her 60s Sally had voted for their future. 
 
Contrary to the clear positions of Jane and Sally, Alan from County Durham still had “mixed 
feelings”. At the time of the result he’d been happy because he had hoped that Brexit would stop 
the country “wasting” so much money on Europe and “far, far too much immigration”. But he 
was also worried about the implications. He runs a small business and needs to “send things 
abroad occasionally […] to France, all over…” He was unsure: “would that affect things? Will 
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concerned him most, “holidays and everything…” So many things yet “no one, still no one 
knows”. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION: BREXIT FUTURES 
How did people encounter and relate to Brexit in the impasse between the referendum on 26th 
June 2016 and the anticipated exit from the EU in 2019? And what kind of event is Brexit 
becoming in the midst of other uncertainties that, in part, compose the contemporary condition? 
The opening accounts capture moments in an impasse. Whilst already dated, they are an 
important documentation of how people were feeling at the time; a set of feelings that are 
perhaps already estranged. Brexit sometimes becomes part of the background of everyday life 
but, as we write, Brexit also continues to have the ‘impression of a major event’1 as the 
possibility of stark and divergent outcomes are named – ‘no deal’, ‘hard Brexit’, ‘soft Brexit’, 
‘transitional arrangement’ – and radically different futures proliferate: new trade deals, fewer 
immigrants, regained sovereignty, separated families, lost jobs, increased racism, and so on. In 
this paper, we trace how Brexit happens as a set of incommensurate events and stay with Brexit 
as it becomes entangled with and (re)made through people’s affectively imbued relations to a 
range of futures. From Jane’s weak hope of it not being as bad as it could be, to Alan’s hope that 
the country would stop “wasting” so much money on Europe, Brexit becomes an event through 
a mix of hoped and feared, promised and threatened, futures.  
 
In focusing on what kind of event(s) Brexit is becoming and how it is entangled with 
ways of living with/in uncertainty, we intervene in embryonic work on Brexit and other 
seemingly disruptive geopolitical events. We exemplify an approach to the geographies of events 
that stays with, and attempts to follow, what kind of event something becomes as it is variously 
encountered (Anderson and Wilson, 2018). In doing so, we supplement accounts that aim to 
explain the event of Brexit by reference to one or more cause whether new or old forms of 
racism and xenophobia that mark a European ‘crisis of liberalism’ and reactivate colonial legacies 
(Bhambra, 2017; Emejulu, 2016); a deferred response to the effects of austerity and post-Fordist 
changes in class composition (Mckenzie, 2017; MacLeod and Jones, 2018); a revolt by those ‘left 
behind’ from economic globalisation (Goodwin & Heath, 2016); or an effect of age and unequal 
distributions of opportunity (Dorling, 2016), to name just some. Whilst the work of explanation 
is important, it involves a particular mode of inquiry whereby the event becomes a secondary 
                                                 
1 The phrase ‘impression of a major event’ is taken from a dialogue between Jacques Derrida and 
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effect to be explained by reference to an already existing and known primary cause (or set of 
causes). More speculative work on the ‘implications’ of Brexit for various geographies (of 
citizenship, of the nation state, of regional economic development, of multiculturalism, and so 
on) retains but reverses this relation between cause and effect. Brexit becomes the cause of 
(potential) national and supra-national geographical transformations and consequences 
(Bachmann & Sidaway, 2016; Los et al, 2017). Importantly, whilst our approach aims to 
supplement these ways of relating to geopolitical events, it does not aim to replace them. By 
orientating our inquiry around ‘everyday Brexits’ or, rather, the scenes, figures, signs, and stories 
that are Brexit for different people, we trace how multiple versions of Brexit coexist in the 
impasse between decision and possible exit. Rather than one single geopolitical event, as the 
name ‘Brexit’ would suggest, multiple Brexits coexist. Whether Brexit becomes as the imminent 
return of waning sovereignty, the revival of ‘racialised structures of feeling’ (Virdee & McGeever, 
2018: 1804), the loss of liberal tolerance (Wilson, 2016), or a slow onset economic disaster, each 
Brexit is a manner of relating to present uncertainty in a way that entangles Brexit with residual, 
dominant, and emerging affective conditions and formations of nation, identity, and belonging. 
What, then, can an understanding of ‘everyday Brexits’ tell us about broader claims that 
the geo-historical present is characterised by uncertainty? And how is the present inhabited (and 
remade) in relation to such uncertainty? Numerous attempts have been made to diagnose how 
uncertainty has become something close to a shared, but differentially articulated and 
individuated structure of feeling that crosses, dissolves, and creates social differences (see Lorey, 
2015; Berlant, 2011). In this context, Brexit has been interpreted as a symptom of uncertainty 
and as compensation for uncertainty. The act of voting to exit the European Union has not only 
been placed within a sequence of ‘unpredictable’ events in a turbulent geo-historical present, but 
also explained in relation to the uncertainties that accompany neoliberal ways of governing 
economy and life, which was evidenced by the Leave campaign’s desire to ‘take back control’. By 
following how people relate to Brexit in the current impasse, we complicate these general claims 
by honing in on the different ways people live with uncertainty. Rather than reduce uncertainty 
to a static, explanatory context, we expand on recent work on everyday practices of futures-
making to argue that Brexit is constituted through specific ‘modes of uncertainty’ that 
differentiate within a seemingly singular and shared sense of normalized and intensifying 
uncertainty. We thus expand the concept of ‘modes of uncertainty’ beyond its original use in 
work concerned with the ways in which states and other formal actors govern futures 
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characterised by a distinctive affective orientation (as expressed and enacted through the 
optimism, dismay, hope and other tones with which Jane, Sally, and Alan talked about Brexit). 
The paper draws on interviews with 108 people in the North East region of England. In 
section two we place Brexit in the context of claims that a spreading and intensifying uncertainty 
has become something like a ‘structure of feeling’ that characterises what it feels like to dwell in 
the geo-historical present. We introduce the concept of ‘modes of uncertainty’ as a means of 
orientating inquiry to what kind of event(s) Brexit became as it was entangled with people’s 
everyday lives and concerns. After a reflection on the challenges of researching in an impasse 
(section 3), the paper turns to empirical material, collected across six months, to map the ‘modes 
of uncertainty’ that sees Brexit become different kinds of event in the impasse between the UK’s 
decision to leave the EU and its formal exit. Specifying negative hope, national optimism, apprehensive 
hope and fantasies of action as different modes of uncertainty that differentiate between, but also cut 
across, existing and emerging political (dis)identifications that surround Brexit, we show how 
each mode of uncertainty not only renders the future present, but also (re)makes the affective 
sense of the geo-historical present. In addition to summarising the consequences of our approach 
and arguments for embryonic work on Brexit and other geopolitical events, we conclude by 
reflecting on the implications of our emphasis on ‘modes of uncertainty’ for geographical work 
more widely. 
 
2 STRUCTURES OF FEELING AND MODES OF UNCERTAINTY 
As part of multiple efforts to make sense of Brexit, politicians and commentators have placed it 
in a sequence of ‘unpredictable’ geopolitical events that have occurred in the wake of the 2007 
financial crisis. Simultaneously connected to a ‘crisis of (neo)liberalism’, a ‘crisis of globalisation’, 
and other actual or anticipated crises, Brexit has become another expression of the turbulence 
that supposedly characterises the contemporary liberal democracies of Western Europe and 
North America. This is a turbulence that finds expression in unanticipated election results, 
including the election of Donald Trump; the rise of a range of left and right populisms; and the 
emergence of candidates independent of traditional parties, such as Emmanuel Macron in 
France. It is a turbulence that is also felt in the apparent waning of an already-fragile faith in the 
infrastructures of liberal democracy (including the media and ideals/ideas of truth and tolerance); 
attempts to name the alternatives that are slowly emerging (e.g. ‘Post-Truth’); and speculations 
about the future of Western liberal democracies (including the becoming authoritarian or fascist 
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In such a geo-historical present, which is also constituted by climate change, terrorism, 
automation, and a myriad other unpredictable event-conditions that are enacted as threatening 
and/or disruptive, it is clear that Brexit uncertainties are happening in the midst of a collective, 
affective, condition of intensified and normalized uncertainty. Uncertainty has become the 
common thread that crosses and connects a host of terms used to discern the affective character 
of the contemporary (risk, turbulence, precarity, insecurity, instability, and other synonyms) in 
attempts to diagnose the waning and ending of the stability that was promised to some (middle-
class, heterosexual, predominantly white) forms of life as part of the Fordist, post-WW2 
settlement (Neilson & Rossiter, 2008). Such an affective condition marks a present in which a 
‘crisis ordinariness’ (Berlant, 2011) has taken hold as social democratic pillars have fallen away 
(unions, pensions), ‘flexibility’ increasingly characterises regimes of work and non-work, and 
insecurity haunts multiple structural positions, from unemployed youth to the managerial class 
(c.f. Berlant, 2011; Lorey, 2015; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2006). Staying with – rather than 
attempting to prematurely resolve – this ambiguity and terminological multiplicity tells us 
something about what kind of thing this affective condition is. Adapting the term from Williams 
(1977), we might diagnose intensified and generalised uncertainty as one amongst multiple 
contemporary ‘structures of feeling’. Uncertainty would be the name for a structure of feeling 
that is characterised by the feeling of having multiple possibilities whilst simultaneously being 
unable to attach to and name coherent possibilities, as stable trajectories between past, present, and 
future fray and become fragile, are disrupted or interrupted, or fade and end2. For Williams, as an 
affective form of mediation tied to distinctive social-spatial formations, a ‘structure of feeling’ is 
a common affective quality felt across otherwise disparate events, practices, and processes. 
Structures of feeling “exert palpable pressures and set effective limits on action” (ibid 131-132) 
as affective resonances between diverse phenomena and intensifications that cluster around 
particular scenes, figures, and objects. We might say, then, that as a structure of feeling, 
uncertainty conditions how Brexit is related to and becomes present for people without 
determining how. Uncertainty occasionally intensifies, before dissipating as it becomes part of 
the background sense of ‘predictable-unpredictability’ (Southwood, 2011) that rumbles along as 
people learn to live with and through the precarious present. 
If the concept of ‘structures of feeling’ gives us something like an affective context for 
‘Brexit uncertainties’, it also presents us with a challenge: how to be attentive to the kinds of 
                                                 
2 We use ‘possibilities’, rather than deploy a distinction between potentiality and possibility, to 
present the paradoxes of uncertainty as a structure of feeling. That is to say that multiple 
possibilities have been actualised but because of their multiplicity, attaching to a single, coherent, 
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differences in ways of relating to uncertainty that Jane, Sally, and Alan expressed in the prologue. 
How are we to attend to differences within a seemingly single structure of feeling without 
ascribing differences to variations in individual interpretation? This problem was unresolved by 
Williams (1977) as he tracked relations between structures of feeling at the level of the nation-
state, and ascribed structures of feeling to either generations or classes. To differentiate within 
structures of feeling we deploy and expand the concept of ‘modes of uncertainty’. As we use it, a 
‘mode of uncertainty’ is a felt way of registering and responding to uncertainty in a manner that 
enables it to be lived with and in (even if that promise is not realized, and uncertainty becomes 
overwhelming). By this, we mean that a mode of uncertainty involves a shared affective 
disposition – towards self, others, and world – that constitutes a form of living 
within/after/around uncertainty that is somehow characteristic. At the same time, it involves a 
disclosure of uncertainty and an attunement to it in such a way as to have a felt impact. The term 
‘modes of uncertainty’ is specifically introduced by Samimian-Darash and Rabinow (2015: 201) 
in the context of what they describe, after Foucault, as a “motion of problematisation” in which 
‘uncertainty’ replaces governmental formations that are organised around “danger/certainty” and 
“risk/probability”. Although they say little about it, and theirs is not a conceptual use, for us the 
qualifier ‘mode’ serves to sensitise to differences and thus allows for a kind of engaged pluralism 
in analysis. Beginning from this emphasis on differences within commonality, we want to develop 
the concept into a way of orientating inquiry to shared ways of registering and responding to 
uncertainty.  
To achieve such an orientation, we learn from and develop recent work on ‘future 
geographies’ which demonstrates how uncertainty surfaces as a particular kind of affectively and 
materially present problem that is variously mitigated, accepted, embraced, denied, or otherwise 
lived with (see Newhouse, 2017; Thieme, 2017). This gives us a starting point for differentiating 
between ‘modes of uncertainty’ as well as a question for work on Brexit as a particular kind of 
event: through what forms does uncertainty register as a specific problem that, in part, 
constitutes the sense of the present? First, every ‘mode of uncertainty’ will involve a specific way 
of affectively registering uncertainty, thus (re)making the sense of the geo-historical present as 
uncertainty surfaces. A mode of uncertainty may also involve the affective and/or ideational 
presence of pasts (including past possible or potential futures) and so is not only about the 
presence of the future and relations to it but involves a set of relations that entangle past-
present-future into a particular configuration. As a consequence, and as terms like precarity 
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gesture towards, it involves a particular way of feeling and being within the present (cf. Hitchen 
on austerity).  
Second, every mode of uncertainty will involve anticipatory techniques, practices and/or 
dispositions that enable translations between certainties and uncertainties as they are hoped for 
and feared, mitigated, created, and entangled, in a dynamic set of affective investments and 
attachments that are tied into other social-spatial formations. Brexit is governed through logics 
of prediction and premediation that constitute the sense of an impasse or transitional present. 
Everyday relations also involve numerous forms of anticipatory action: preparing to leave or 
return to the UK, saving money, avoiding people, applications for dual citizenship, changing 
business suppliers, stockpiling, and so on. But everyday relations with Brexit also include waiting. 
As with other situations of, what we might call, frustrated, thwarted, impossible, or absent, 
agency (see Horton, 2016; Raynor, 2019), it might be that Brexit is now constituted by a series of 
anticipatory practices and dispositions that blur the line between action and inaction and thus 
question the emphasis on identifiable anticipatory action. This might include switching off, 
indifference, hoping, forgetting, not talking with friends, and so on (c.f. Allison, 2013; Jeffrey, 
2010). 
A ‘mode of uncertainty’ is a way of registering and responding to uncertainty that 
connects and renders indistinct events and the everyday. Modes of uncertainty – here what we 
are naming negative hope, national optimism, apprehensive hope and fantasies of action – vary between one 
another in two ways. First, in how uncertainty comes to have a felt impact and second, in the 
specific past-present-future relation that emerges alongside and through particular affective 
qualities. Modes of uncertainty are shared between people in that they are common patterns that 
simultaneously shape and condition how uncertainty can be lived with/in, and are the ongoing 
effect of innumerable practices of registering and responding to uncertainty. Whilst not the focus 
of this paper, people may move between modes, and their relation with events will also be 
affectively conditioned by the legacies, (non)belongings, and (non)attachments they bring to 
encounters with events that are always-already mediated (Ahmed, 2004). Despite this variation, 
orientating inquiry towards ‘modes of uncertainty’ enables us to follow how Brexit becomes a 
particular type of event/events, rather than only an effect of other causes or a cause with a set of 
effects. What kind of thing Brexit becomes is entangled with, first, the particular presences of 
and relations between past and future and, second, the sense of the present. Before drawing out 
different modes of uncertainty, we reflect on researching in an impasse.  
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We interviewed 108 people between the ages of 18 and 90 in the North East of England. As a 
region, it contains some of the most deprived local authorities in the country and was named in a 
leaked government document as most likely to be hardest hit by the government’s Brexit strategy 
(Mason, 2018). Given the uneven impacts of austerity, uneven development, and the spatial 
politics of political disillusionment, geographically specific accounts are critical (Burrell and 
Hopkins, 2018; MacLeod & Jones, 2018).  
The North East voted to leave with 58% of the vote, one of the highest regional 
margins3. Out of the twelve local areas within the North East, only Newcastle-Upon-Tyne voted 
to remain with 50.7% of the vote. Interviews were achieved using a snowball method and 
conducted across the region in both urban and rural locations and with people from a range of 
backgrounds, employment histories, political leanings, class positions, and different connections 
to the region. The sample was predominantly white British, with the exception of 10 EU 
nationals from Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, and Poland, and 2 participants from South 
and Southeast Asia, all of whom were resident in the North East at the time of the referendum. 
It contained both leave and remain voters, people who didn’t vote, and people who couldn’t 
vote (either because they failed to register or were ineligible), although these categories conceal 
concerns that are held in common and different intensities of attachment to remain and leave 
positions. 
The research was conducted between November 2016 and May 2017, in the period 
between the referendum and the triggering of Article 50, but before the 2017 general election in 
an effort to understand how Brexit surfaced in an impasse filled with contradictory predictions. 
For Berlant (2011), an impasse is a type of “stretched-out present” (5), or a “stretch of time in 
which one moves around with a sense that the world is at once intensely present and enigmatic” 
(4). This emphasis on the intertwining of the intense and the enigmatic resonates with our 
experience of the shifting tones of our interviews and the very different issues and concerns that 
clustered around and attached to Brexit. Discussion of Brexit quickly moved into an inchoate 
tangle of concerns, frustrations, fears, joys, and hopes that ‘stretched’ the present into imagined 
futures of loss and return, as well as lingering pasts. Interviews would track between the 
identifiable and discrete scenes and figures that constituted the immediate present – the day of 
the referendum result, Theresa May, the triggering of Article 50, exchange rates – and a host of 
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concerns that were more or less distant; imperialism, a changing world order, multiculturalism, 
immigration, and so on4. 
Partly, this ‘stretching’ is something common to interviewing as method. Rather than 
freezing or arresting life, multiple topics surface, shift, and become entangled as interviews 
happen (see Bissell 2014). But, this stretching is also telling of what Brexit was becoming in an 
impasse in which various transitions were or weren’t felt to be on the way, promised and 
threatened futures proliferated, and, in the midst of such feelings, people made sense in ways 
that moved between different positions and dispositions as they got on with ordinary life. The 
interviews attempted, then, to understand Brexit in a ‘present’ that was at once transitory – a 
particular moment in the process of Brexit – and spatially and temporally stretched as different 
pasts and futures were folded back into how people encountered and related to it.  
If researching (and writing) in an impasse presents a set of challenges, then work on 
Brexit presents further still. Universities have been described by sections of the tabloid press as 
breeding grounds for anti-Brexit bias and ‘propaganda’, placing them in a category of elites that 
were accused of working against ‘the will of the people’ (see section 4.4). At the same time, it has 
been noted that the widespread shock and dismay that was expressed by some academics in 
response to the leave vote, reflected a relatively privileged, socially-liberal position (Isakjee and 
Lorne, 2018: 5). Whilst difficult to fully account for how this impacted the research, such a 
context cannot be ignored. Interviewees talked about a general reluctance to speak openly about 
their views, which was a concern that was especially pronounced amongst leave voters and so, 
aside from a small number of instances where family members were interviewed together, focus 
groups were not considered to be an option so soon after the referendum.  
In what follows we draw out four divergent modes of uncertainty which coexist to form 
a ‘stretched-out’ present.  Each mode coexisted with various ordinary practices of detachment 
from the event of Brexit in a way that dampened not only the intensity of the referendum result, 
but also the intensity of hopes, optimisms, and other moods of uncertainty. People talked about 
no longer paying attention; only partly engaging with a political process that was felt to be too 
complicated; and how Brexit was no longer a topic of conversation. For some of our 
interviewees it had already “died a death”, a sentiment that is likely to have altered since. 
Memories of intense responses to the result and anger about the campaigns coexisted with 
feelings of flatness. Reactivating the never quite residual types of disconnection that have long 
existed in relation to formal, parliamentary politics in the U.K. (see Clarke et al, 2017) people 
                                                 
4 The interviews were anonymised and focused on: the moment of hearing the result and the 
immediate aftermath; people’s relationships to the leave and remain campaigns; and their feelings 
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engaged with Brexit through a complex and ever-changing mix of detachment, fragile hope, 
optimism, apprehension, anger, and alarm. We start, then, with a mode of uncertainty in which 
Brexit becomes an occasion of hope: the hope of an end. 
 
4 MODES OF UNCERTAINTY AND MULTIPLE BREXITS 
4.1 Negative Hope and Brexit as End 
Our first mode of uncertainty is connected to the sense of a failed present; a sense of 
decline, disconnection, and stasis. In many cases, it was felt that everyday life was not only 
difficult – to greater and lesser degrees – but that people’s lives were perpetually remade by 
forces that were external, opaque, and often working against them (including London, 
government cuts, a loss of British pride, a lack of community spirit, online shopping, 
immigration laws, and health and safety regulations). In this context, Brexit was felt as a welcome 
interruption to a present that wasn’t working and became the ground for a hope that something 
will end. 
49-year-old Andy, a gamekeeper from a small seaport town in Northumberland, told the 
story of a wasteful National Health Service (NHS) that was strangled by pointless protocols, 
disorganisation, and a lack of care. Having previously worked for the NHS he was particularly 
frustrated with their policy on crutches: “you cannot hand them back in”. Whilst the connection 
to the EU was not explicit, Andy’s detailed account of his visits to outpatients, and the amassing 
of disused crutches in homes across the North East of England, was offered as an illustration of 
something broken – ‘unbelievable wastage’ – and just one of many examples of something “that 
needs to be turned around”. Similarly, musician and producer, Dave, discussed the decline of the 
region’s livestock marts as evidence of a wider trend of deterioration. Dave was saddened that 
farmers in Northumberland no longer have the time and have to work “to death doing other 
things because [farming] just doesn’t pay anymore”.  Dave’s wife Mary – a former shepherd – 
noted that the marts used to be a ‘big social occasion’, and that the opportunity for sociability 
had been reduced now that the sheep and cattle are taken straight off the farms. As a result, and 
even though he was disappointed, Dave hadn’t been surprised by the outcome of the 
referendum, because he had recognised that “something had to give”.  
What that something looks like was less clear, but the accumulation of disused crutches 
and deadweight livestock is both presented as evidence of something wrong and a sense of slow 
decline and ‘stuckness’. In the midst of talking about Brexit and the current impasse, these 
anecdotes became a way of narrating sadness, disappointments, and frustration with things and 
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was generally discussed in the context of an unhappy present and, by extension, a general 
opportunity for some kind of change. In this first mode of uncertainty, the event of the 
referendum is thus felt as a cut or break from the present condition, and often began from a 
remembered but fading sense of relief on hearing the result.  
When reflecting on hope, Lingis (2012) highlights how central discontinuity can be to the 
functioning of hope as a mode of relation. In contrast to Berlant (2011), who gives credence to 
continuity in the form of optimistic attachments, for Lingis (ibid. 23) “[h]ope arises in a break 
with the past”. In this break “[t]here is a kind of cut and the past is let go of”. To adapt Lingis’ 
formulation, hope arose ‘in’ the break that was the referendum result. Yet, despite such hope, 
people rarely expected immediate or dramatic change. Instead, given the range of ordinary ills 
that were attached to the present, the event of leaving simply offered the attachable promise of 
an end, if not quite a solution. It offered what Taussig (2002) calls a ‘glimmer’ of hope: the 
moment in which the chance of something different opens up. Brexit, then, became the grounds 
for a form of negative hope – a better future that might or might not materialise but that would 
hopefully end something bad or rupture the otherwise smooth workings of external forces that, 
as Frank, a retiree from Gateshead, put it, have a “massive bearing on how we live”. Brexit 
became this ground for change at a time when faith in a variety of institutions was lost and there 
were few other sources of hope left that people felt they could attach to and believe in. This was 
a recognizable narrative, and one that was also referenced by participants who didn’t identify 
with this position themselves. As one mother and son suggested: 
 
Louise: “I think [leavers] felt powerless and this was one little way that they [could…” 
Joe: “…have] hope for a change, because this might change things, whereas a new 
government didn’t seem to change anything for them”. 
 
In referring to a powerless ‘they’ Joe and Louise drew a distinction between themselves 
and other ‘leavers’, not only revealing their relative privilege but offering an explanatory context 
for the result that was based on imagining how others felt (Dorling, 2016; Bhambra, 2017). 
Louise, a university lecturer in the natural sciences, had voted to leave, whilst Joe, a recent 
graduate, had ‘regrettably panicked’ at the last minute and had voted to remain. Having had 
multiple conversations with people in the aftermath of the vote, Louise noted that the wealth in 
Westminster must be galling for those in regions “so poverty stricken” and “disenfranchised”. 
As Joe put it “they [leavers] voted knowing that it is not going to get better quickly” but that it 










This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
The need for some kind of change was a narrative common to leave voters, but there 
were also remainers who felt similarly. For example, Patrick, a joiner in his thirties, didn’t vote 
and didn’t like the outcome, but nevertheless felt that Brexit presented the opportunity for a 
much-needed disruption, despite feeling that both sides of the campaign had been peddling 
propaganda. However, notwithstanding this feeling, he didn’t expect it to be enough and was 
perversely hoping that Brexit might be a catastrophe: 
 
“I never felt looked after by the government, in the past I’ve had quite a few dramatic 
things happen… and I feel like they always failed us. And now I just feel like I’ll fucking 
eek out a path on my own […] Maybe it’s a little bit, as well, to do with, like, not feeling 
like it’s got worse enough, do you know? Like something really radical has to change 
before things can get better? I don’t know. Is that bad to want that drama?” 
 
The above examples evidence a general feeling that things aren’t working and move between a 
variety of sites, scenes, and forms of powerlessness. However, in other cases, the hope for an 
end, intensified around particular issues. For retired teacher, Amy, who had felt ‘utter relief’ on 
hearing the referendum result and had sensed a ‘general mood’ for leaving, it was about stopping 
a European federalism. As she said: “enough is enough”! According to Amy, nothing changed 
“dramatically”, but that’s what she found so frightening… we’ve slipped into it... it needed to be 
stopped”! For many others it was the imagined-felt presence of immigrants. Pete, also a retiree, 
had been unable to get to the polling station and was worried when he heard the results but was 
comforted by the thought that Brexit might halt immigration, having identified it as a particular 
‘problem’ for the North East. He had heard about a small community in Gateshead where the 
council had “dropped 800 people”, putting “big pressure on the health service”. For him, the 
UK – and England in particular – was an especially “easy target […] because [immigrants] get a 
house… they get medical treatment, they get money”. He “hoped that might stop… without 
being racist”. 
Whilst Pete thought immigration was already a problem, Sally saw immigration as a 
problem that was on the horizon and one that was connected to her general dislike for “where 
the country was going”. Whilst painting a very different picture of the North East she 
nevertheless identified a trajectory of change that needed to be interrupted: 
 
“There is so much expense on Brussels and other things. And I think that it’s mostly the 
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towns such as Middlesbrough are heaving with immigrants, erm… Peterborough is 
heaving with immigrants, Boston in Lincolnshire is heaving… I mean we in the North 
East see very few, but it’s going to come, it’s going to happen” 
 
Sally and Pete’s views were echoed elsewhere, with the EU considered synonymous with ‘out 
of control’ immigration and a changing social landscape. Frank, for instance, who described 
himself as having a steady income from his pension and ‘not a Conservative voter by any 
means’, suggested that he was “not anti-immigration” but that immigration was one of the 
main reasons for voting leave. Against a backdrop of other concerns – “people on the dole 
making a career out of it”, nursing homes making a profit, and the political correctness that 
was, for him, “ruining the country” – he suggested: “I haven’t got a prejudiced bone in my 
body. I’m live and let live, but I think we have a saturation point… when you’re looking at 
your services and your services are stretched and it’s NHS or social services or whatever… 
that definitely is a problem for me”. Whilst he didn’t explain how the vote might change 
things, he was clear that he didn’t expect the result to affect him. His vote, he suggested, was 
for the younger generations: “a selfless act”. 
Connected to the negative effects of other felt changes, Frank’s discussion of 
immigration like Sally’s and Pete’s, involved a declaration of not being racist, typical of 
contemporary forms of ‘raceless racism’ (Goldberg, 2008; Nowicka, 2018). Here, those things 
considered broken in earlier accounts – welfare support, security, community spirit, general 
services – become attached to the issue of immigration. These attachments were central to, and 
amplified by, the Vote Leave campaign (see Virdee & McGeever, 2018), whilst the media has 
also played a role in generating fears and anxieties about interconnected ends (of national pre-
eminence, of white privilege, of the promised futures associated with employment, of how a 
place used to be) and connecting them to the figure of the migrant As Gilroy (2004) argued, 
when decline and the loss of imperial power ‘remains unmourned’, the ‘unacknowledged pain of 
loss gives rise to powerful displacement mechanisms that govern hostility towards immigrants’ 
(ibid. 110) and push out other explanatory contexts for decline.  
 
4.2 National Optimisms and Brexit as Advent 
The negative hope of  Brexit as end blurs with a closely connected mode that might be 
called ‘national optimism’, which makes Brexit into an advent of a better future on the way. Brexit 
was associated with a progressive temporality of development and improvement, enveloped in a 
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was only occasionally expressed through named hopes. Berlant (2011: original emphasis) 
describes optimism as a ‘force’ that “moves you out of yourself and into the world in order to 
bring closer the satisfying something that you cannot generate on your own but sense in the wake of 
a person, a way of life, an object, project, concept, or scene”. The ‘satisfying something’, in this case, 
is the return of a feeling of preeminence, often clustering around a desire for (regained) control. 
Unlike the negative hope of the previous section, which focused on Brexit as a form of release 
or end, these reactions depicted new beginnings.  
For example, Amy, who had talked of her concerns about a European federalism 
(section 4.1), described the impending separation from the ‘strange ship’ of the EU and the 
potential for regained glory and oscillated between notions of control and pre-eminence as she 
did. Having felt ‘utter relief’ on hearing the result, months on she felt “very optimistic” about the 
UK being able to make its own decisions. Amy hadn’t been “bothered” with the referendum 
campaigns because they were “so negative, always looking for the worst thing and never the 
good things”. Instead, Brexit was to do with “blue sky thinking” and having “something which is 
bigger than Europe” and not “just a narrow thing like immigration”. She thought the country 
should be going out into the world, like her son who was working abroad. As she put it: “Europe 
is a little thing, it’s a pigmy compared to the world stage… and we’re better out of it and forging 
on, on our own”. In noting the need to look beyond Europe, she also referenced Africa as “our 
biggest failure” and suggested that “we should not have abandoned them when we left”. Citing 
the prevalence of disease and starvation, she wanted the UK to “get back there, have a look at 
what’s happening and go in under our own flag”. 
As Virdee and McGeever (2018: 1803) argue, such a deep nostalgia for empire and 
expression of moral superiority is made possible by occluding the racist ‘underside of the British 
imperial project’: the ‘corrosive legacies’ of racial-colonial domination (c.f. Lowe, 2015; Shilliam, 
2018). In this case, various national figures, myths, and events are plotted within a story about a 
better future that (re)enacts nationalist feelings of exceptionality, alongside a sense of abdicated 
responsibility towards former colonies. A newly independent UK, rather than Brexit, becomes 
the attachable ground for renewed optimism and restored pride. Specific hopes-for are only 
vaguely offered but are nonetheless enveloped in a mood of confidence that a better future will 
emerge once the UK is no longer ‘shackled’.  
In Amy’s case, Brexit was felt as an advent rather than end: something good is arriving (or 
will do once Brexit happens). This something good was often in the form of a return, or the 
continuation of something that was side-tracked by the European project. Whilst different 
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generally denied through gestures of confidence. This could be seen in narratives such as Sally’s 
which reiterated her belief that Brexit would be a success even if it wasn’t necessarily going to be 
easy: 
 
“We’ve got lots to offer; I’m sure we’ll do it. I’ve got every confidence that once we get 
through it, I do believe it’ll happen…I’ve got great faith in this country and where it stands 
in the world, you know? We had the Commonwealth, oh that’s gone, that’s fair enough, 
things move on, things change. And I think things might be a bit rocky for a little while, 
but we’ll get there. We will. Because I really believe in the country, I believe in the country 
as a whole, I believe in our standing in the world”. 
 
The form of the event is different, in part because a nationalist story of Britishness serves as the 
legitimising object of optimistic attachment. By making the present into a period of waiting for 
the restoration of past glory and standing, the uncertainty of the end result is denied, and past 
triumph and pre-eminence provides a guide to the post-Brexit future. Whilst this generalised 
sense of confidence is not quite equivalent to nameable attachments, it existed alongside the 
expressed desire for the return of past ways of life, and more importantly, the past glory 
associated with a now lost, but once prominent, global position, even while recognising the 
impossibility of its return. Here, Brexit doesn’t just draw on ‘deep reservoirs of imperial longing’, 
as Verdee and McGeever (2018) put it, but deep reservoirs of imperial belief.  
Brexit as advent happens, then, within the orbit of the ambivalent structure of feeling 
that Gilroy (2004) names as ‘postimperial/postcolonial melancholia’. That is a melancholic and 
nostalgic attachment to past glories and mythologies of empire that enables a sense of moral 
superiority, and a selective, less potent version of colonial history that can remain unchallenged 
as a result. Thus, following Gilroy (p.99), Brexit might be said to offer a relief from the painful 
obligation to accept the loss of empire and to ‘work through the grim details of imperial and 
colonial history’ – a relief that is perhaps further enabled by focusing on Britain’s fight against 
the ‘tyranny’ of an uncompromising European imperialism. 
Despite forms of ambivalence, in this mode of relating to uncertainty the EU becomes 
less the cause of an inchoate sense of something wrong, as in Brexit as end, and more an external 
actor holding Britain back. This sense of compromised national agency mixed and blurred often 
with a sense of impeded personal agency, which was expressed in a desire for more control in 
different contexts. People told stories about the bureaucracy that touched their lives. Whether it 
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have control over that? Why can’t we get back control?”, or Pete’s desire for “more control over 
our own destiny” in response to “Brussels bringing rules out that we all object to… that every ‘i’ 
has to be dotted and every ‘t’ has to be crossed to perfection”. 
 
4.3 Apprehensive Hope and Brexit as Continuation… Perhaps 
Brexit as end and advent, whilst different, both enact a sense of renewed ‘prospective 
momentum’ (Miyazaki 2004) that was grounded in the event of the UK’s separation from the 
EU. Exiting the EU was felt to make either a less-bad life or some form of better life possible. 
Berlant (2011: 199) describes impasses as “decompositional”: “in the unbound temporality of the 
stretch of time, it [an impasse] marks a delay that demands activity”. The ‘activity’ of negative 
hope and national optimism, which at points blur and overlap, reduces the sense of an impasse 
by re-establishing a progressive form of temporality. In this respect, both modes of uncertainty 
resonate with Vote Leave’s promise of positive change as expressed in their ‘Take back control’ 
slogan, albeit a forward momentum refracted through and activating imperial longing and anti-
immigrant affect (Virdee & McGeever, 2018). However, both modes of uncertainty coexist with 
other modes in which uncertainty becomes a pressing problem that can’t be reduced, and Brexit 
is felt to be an impending problem or even disaster. In the next two sections, we briefly 
introduce two such modes: fantasies of action and, first, apprehensive hopefulness, which was 
common to the narratives of many remain voters. 
Whilst the first two modes of uncertainty largely connect the EU with a variety of ills, 
both explicitly and implicitly, forms of apprehensive hope emerge out of a very different relation. 
Rather than the EU accumulating a host of ills, it is exiting that functions as the blank figure 
around which a cluster of disparate apprehensions gather and attach. For instance, Margot, an 
ordained vicar who has lived in County Durham for a decade, was anticipating price hikes, 
worrying about a “dis-united UK”, and not being able to relate to the North East anymore. 
Tash, who was in Sunderland at the time of the vote, was also feeling “pretty negative” because 
of the divisions that Brexit had created but also because of what it might do to the economy. As 
a mental health worker in her twenties, she was worried about the stability of the NHS and the 
potential withdrawal of funding for NHS courses, which would force her to reconsider her 
career options. Asher, a Singaporean national and engineer with indefinite leave to remain, was 
similarly worried about the economic effects. He was “mildly concerned” for the value of his 
house and the depreciation of the pound, which would mean that his bills in Singapore would 
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potential to exacerbate inequalities and social problems in the region, particularly in “places like 
East Durham and Peterlee” where she worked as a volunteer5. 
Despite such apprehension and gloomy forecasts, Brexit was only rarely anticipated as a 
catastrophe, although occasionally people did angrily describe Brexit as a disaster (see section 
4.4). Rather, in this context the worries focused on the changes that might occur to something 
valued and perhaps previously taken for granted, in ordinary but not necessarily dramatic ways. 
Importantly, despite little certainty that anything would change, Brexit had unsettled them: the 
primary change was atmospheric. But whilst the hope that the future will be ‘fine’ or ‘ok’ was 
made fragile by worry, in many cases there was still an expectation that normality would 
continue. Rather than something positive, their hope was that not much would change. In these 
narratives there was no sense that Brexit would lead to a better future. Instead, energy was 
invested in a fragile hope that the post-Brexit future would be much like the present. For 
instance, despite concerns Tash was assuming “things will be okay” because she had no other 
choice; Asher had confidence in the UK’s “orderly civil service” and its ability to transition 
without too much damage; and Karen’s initial concerns about societal tensions were “beginning 
to fade” as things settled down. Whilst some people were comforted by this sense that “things 
would be okay in the end”, others put Brexit “into context”. Robert, a reverend with two 
children, had felt “shock” on hearing the result, but also felt ambivalent. He was worried about 
the economic effects of Brexit and the exacerbation of social divisions, having described some 
“sections of the public” as having had a “collective nervous breakdown”. Brexit was the biggest 
political decision in Robert’s lifetime, but whilst he was not confident that anyone knew what 
would happen he thought it unlikely to be as bad as predicted: “I was somewhat sanguine about 
the forecasts before the Brexit vote, but I’m markedly more sanguine now because so many of 
them have proved incorrect”. Besides, Syria is a “disaster”, as was the “Second Gulf war… the 
stakes were higher …”. 
Brexit oscillated, then, between being a harbinger of worse to come and just another 
non-event. The presence of various traces of a slightly worse future made this a hopeful relation 
unlike the optimism that enacts Brexit as advent. Following Bloch (1998: 341, emphasis added) 
by this we mean that a hopeful relation is one in which “the uncertainty of the outcome remains”. 
Uncertainty remains as it is not disavowed, transcended or deferred as it is in optimistic 
attachments to the nation. Nevertheless, the basis for hopefulness is not unconnected to the 
forms of national optimism we described in Section 4.2. In demonstrating a cautious hope that it 
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will all be fine in the end, we see an underlying confidence in the UK and its status: that it is not 
the kind of country to suffer catastrophe. This form of hope therefore demonstrated some of 
the confidences that were seen in the accounts of Brexit as advent, even whilst these confidences 
weren’t explicitly acknowledged. Quite who would deliver or secure this future was unclear, 
especially as little or no explicit faith was placed in politicians who were described as either ‘liars’ 
or ‘incompetent’. The affective register of this confidence amid uncertainty is best captured by 
Ngai (2005) who describes confidence as the “feeling that cannot be felt” and ascribes its power 
to its “resistance to being psychically registered” (ibid. 76). Confidences vary, but in the midst of 
a swirl of worries, a type of background confidence acts as the basis for a hope whose object is 
the maintenance of the present. As such, apprehensive hopefulness did not involve any explicit 
attachment to a heroic story of past glory – even though it was undoubtedly part of it. Instead, 
its basis was a confidence with diverse roots and routes including: a feeling that the predictions 
of disaster had not come to pass; a sense of interdependence with other European countries; a 
comparison with other countries that were supposedly worse off (including Trump-era America); 
the sense that the country has survived past crises; a residual faith in technocratic management; 
and an unshaken faith in the UK’s status and power 
 
4.4. Fantasies of Action: Brexit as Disaster and Betrayed Promise 
In this last section we consider what happens when negative hope, optimistic 
nationalism, and apprehensive hopefulness were felt to be threatened. In such instances, Brexit 
was a matter of concern again, the practices of detachment and disconnection that for many had 
begun to drain Brexit of its dramatic atmosphere were disrupted. As a result, a desire for ‘correct 
action’ – action capable of rectifying the situation and (re)securing fragile forms of hope – 
emerged alongside a suspicion or paranoia that action or possibility was being thwarted. Such 
desires and suspicions were amplified through the UK print and social media, which reproduced 
and directed these periodic intensifications, albeit against the background of long-term 
dissatisfaction with formal politics (c.f. Clarke et al, 2017). 
For many leave voters who were participating in the hope of the less-bad future or the 
optimism of the better nation, Brexit surfaced in everyday life as a negative event when angers 
and frustrations clustered around figures – both specific and vague – who were felt to be 
attempting to illegitimately thwart the UK’s exit from the EU. This emerged as disillusionment 
and anger with processes and institutions that were deemed to be suspending or slowing down 
the process of leaving (including forms of deliberation and dissensus), as well as anger towards 
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variously felt to be thwarting the ‘will of the people’ and deliberately delaying Brexit. As recent 
graduate, Joe, relayed: 
 
“What annoyed me was people were saying about how much money we would have [because] 
we spend so much money [on the EU] – and then you’ve got this high court battle costing 
millions. You’ve got people taking each other to court, you’ve got some woman trying to sue 
the government because it’s not what she wanted, and there was some woman, some 
millionaire, who found some legal loop hole and tried to sue the government. And so again, 
not the common person with problems trying to do things! So, we’re spending all of this time 
trying to faff about, not coming out, rather than actually saying “we have a majority vote” …” 
 
In narratives such as this one, hope and optimism are still present because the sense that there is 
something better endures, but it coexists with a feeling that someone or something, somewhere, 
is attempting to illegitimately thwart it. As such, as well as attaching anger to particular figures, 
these accounts became part of a wider mood of paranoia or suspicion that clustered around an 
amorphous ‘they’ who were acting to stop Brexit: the ‘elite’, the establishment, ‘liberal luvvies’, or 
‘some woman’. For instance, whilst Mark from Gateshead thought that Brexit will be better for 
his grandchildren and that ‘Britain would prosper’ in the end, he was worried that a lot of people 
were trying to stop it – “not just Europe, but forces in this country as well”. He was particularly 
‘sick of judges’ and people like Gina Miller6 “sticking [their] oar in”. Similarly, Sally was 
anticipating that there “would be a lot of in-fighting” and “a lot of obstacles put in the way”. As 
she stated: “they’re going to make it as difficult as humanly possible for a transition”. As well as 
resonating with populist media and political rhetoric, the sense of an amorphous ‘they’ seemed 
to emerge as a solution to the problem of the unknown: not knowing what was happening with 
the Brexit negotiations, and fearing that their hoped-for future might not come to pass.  
Animating an increasingly fragile and threatened hope for an end or an advent of a better 
future was an impatient desire for some kind of action – or as Joe put it, less ‘faffing’ – so that 
the better future could be sensed. For instance, Louise was concerned that “if you get parliament 
having a vote, you’re going to get somewhere like Scotland trying to block it and it will drag on 
and on and on”. Like others that voted leave she wanted the government to “get on with it” 
because she feared that “uncertainty does more harm” and the longer it takes, the more likely 
that someone would stop it. In this mode, then, Brexit takes on the ‘impression of a major event’ 
                                                 
6 Gina Miller was the lead claimant in a successful legal battle to prevent the government from 
triggering Article 50 without a vote from parliament. She was subjected to significant racist and 
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once again. It crosses a threshold to become, periodically, something dramatic and becomes an 
event with a particular form – an occasion tensed between a betrayed promise on the one hand 
and a promised end or advent on the other.  What we are calling ‘fantasies of action’ involves 
investment in the presumption that someone or something (the government, a group of voters) 
is currently undertaking harmful (in)action together with the promise that some kind of 
presently-absent or faster action can halt or avert a disastrous future.  
Whilst ‘fantasies of action’ is a shared mode of uncertainty, it was during these periodic 
intensifications that identifications as leave or remain voters were re-enacted and expressed often 
with a recognised sense of division or antagonism. Just as many leavers were unsettled by efforts 
to ‘thwart’ Brexit, many remain voters identified occasions when Brexit was felt as a looming 
disaster in ways that unsettled their general confidence that everything would be okay. The sense 
of an unfolding disaster or disaster to come was catalysed by various traces of damage or harms 
that were already happening or yet to come, with anger often directed towards leave supporting 
politicians for their incompetence, lies, or a combination of both. The sense of an unfolding 
disaster was particularly acute in relation to the future of car manufacturing. For library 
volunteer, Michael, the lack of any clear agreement for UK plants meant that Brexit was 
“hovering in the background all of the time, colouring everything.” He had “no faith in the Tory 
government...” because he didn’t think “they’ll do a deal that will benefit the ordinary 
population” and was convinced that it will be “big industry that benefits”:  
 
“Something that’s going to be absolutely terrible… the government sat around the table 
and had talks with Nissan who incidentally are owned by Renault, France. And you can’t 
find any of the details of the insurances [sic] that Nissan has been given… nothing has 
come out at all. What is going to happen to the factories and the general production 
units…? I mean Liverpool has something like 400,000 people that work directly with 
Vauxhall and then there’s all the support services involved. If we have an argument with 
the EU and with the French in particular, they’re going to say: “right close down those 
plants, we’ve got another 24 around Europe, we don’t need those”. 
 
That car manufacturing – and Nissan in particular – were a prominent concern is of no surprise 
in a region where the Sunderland Nissan plant employs approximately 6700 people, and claims 
to support a further 27, 000 in the UK automotive supply chain (three quarters of which are in 
the North East)7. The plant and its continuation has a further symbolic and affective value in a 
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region hit by past waves of deindustrialisation (Nayak, 2019), which was evident in how Michael 
linked his concerns about the “state of the country” back to “what the Tories did in the 80s”: the 
denationalisation of major industry, the loss of ship building, and the ‘destruction of [mining] 
communities’.  
 
Michael was not the only one anxious about Nissan. Whilst his son in law had been given 
assurances about his job, as far as Tom was concerned “the government can say whatever they 
like” and “unless there was support from the government, they [Nissan] could withdraw their 
factory from the North East”. This was a sentiment that was shared by small business owner, 
Alan, who was generally confident about Britain’s ability to find trade elsewhere but was worried 
about “jobs in the UK, for Nissan, Hitachi. How will they fair if they can’t sell their cars to 
Germany without a tariff?” In these accounts the government’s failure to secure an agreement in 
relation to car manufacturing threatens a general sense that things would probably be okay. 
Apprehension intensifies, clusters around a particular issue, and Brexit re-surfaces as an event – 
one that threatens to end or disrupt something that people attach to and value.     
 
5 CONCLUDING COMMENTS: MULTIPLE BREXITS 
Researching in an impasse intensifies the uncertainty that characterizes any work that attempts to 
describe present conditions. The present that we interviewed in and that we write from has 
already changed and was never single or coherent nor separate from past or future presents. In 
this paper, we have attempted to archive this changeable and multiple present by describing the 
different kinds of event Brexit was becoming as it shifted from having the impression of a ‘major 
event’ to becoming part of the background of everyday life in the UK. For our participants in 
the North East, different versions of Brexit emerged from specific modes of uncertainty that 
entangle Brexit and the present in the tendencies and latencies of other events and conditions, 
and residual and emergent structures of feeling including post-imperial/postcolonial 
melancholia, a racialised and xenophobic sense of something wrong, a sense of life as ‘okay’, as 
well as enduring traces of the harms of deindustrialisation and the damages of persistent 
inequality. We could understand negative hope and national optimism as producing a 
redistribution of a sense of ‘prospective momentum’, even if only temporary, – either by ending 
something bad or initiating something better. Both modes of uncertainty, in different ways, make 
Brexit into an occasion for a renewed feeling of possibility. Apprehensive hopefulness happens 
in the orbit of these other modes – an expression of worry about these changes and a hope for 
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promises were betrayed (or threatened), or Brexit inaugurated disaster. At the same time, modes 
of uncertainty create some resonances at the level of mood and attachment between ‘remain’ and 
‘leave’ identifications and affections. For example, whilst they vary in intensity and diverge in 
how they reactivate felt elements of British history, forms of nationalist attachment cross 
between and connect ‘remain’ and ‘leave’ positions. Ultimately, the sense that the future will be 
‘okay’ and the sense it will be ‘better’ after exit both re-enact feelings of confidence in Britain 
(albeit through different elements of the national story, one connected to a feeling of lost pre-
eminence and position, the other more associated with a sense of carrying on or unshakable 
eminence).  
Our focus on the co-existence of these different and specific modes of uncertainty has 
been an attempt to understand what it feels like to live in the midst of the contemporary 
condition(s) that Brexit, the election of Trump, and other events at once express and enact. It is 
through attention to how the present feels that we can explore how a set of seemingly dramatic 
transformations in, for instance, political identification or new forms of racism or nationalism, 
are enacted, reproduced, and made sense of, as people’s moods and attachments shift. Staying 
with the feel of the present – how forms of optimism and hopefulness coexist – is necessary in 
order to understand how seemingly momentous events make a felt difference in, to and through 
people’s lives. On this basis we see two wider implications. 
First, and developing our emphasis on the feel of the present, we have placed Brexit in 
the context of a structure of feeling we have named as generalized and intensifying uncertainty. 
However, generalized and intensified uncertainty is not a single, coherent, structure of feeling. It 
is differentially expressed and enacted through ‘modes of uncertainty’ as it is articulated with 
particular forms of life and living. We understand ‘modes’ as translations of that sense through 
an ensemble of shared practices, resources, and dispositions that render uncertainty palpable and 
relate and respond to it in particular ways (through acquiescence, enjoyment, compensation, and 
so on). Rather than repeat claims that the geo-political present is characterised by uncertainty or 
synonyms such as turbulence or instability, we advocate, instead, tracing the specific modes of 
uncertainty through which the feeling of the present is composed. Specifically, and moving 
beyond Brexit, this means orientating inquiry to the three dimensions around which modes vary, 
in addition to a critical diagnosis of the forces and events that generate uncertainty. This 
includes: the felt impact of uncertainty as it registers – affectively, materially, cognitively – 
 and is translated into a disposition towards self, world and others; the specific practices of 
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particular relations between past-present-future that emerge alongside those practices and felt 
sense.   
Turning to the second implication, we have exemplified a mode of inquiry that stays with 
what an event becomes as it is differently encountered and related to. This approach to the 
dynamic life of events may serve as a way of researching geopolitical events more broadly. It 
moves us beyond a fascination with the moment of evental rupture or disturbance (cf. Berlant 
2011), and into the messy situation of the complicated and changing life of (non/quasi) events as 
they happen in ways that might be dull, vaguely interesting, disturbing, enraging, debilitating, and 
so on. Supplementing explanatory or predictive modes of inquiry does not mean abandoning 
critique as either a practice of disruption or an ethos of hope directed to change. Instead, critique 
is orientated to the conditions of formation for different versions of events, and what the 
consequences might be of how events are encountered and become part of people’s everyday 
lives. This is necessary to avoid presuming beforehand what an event is, how it expresses and 
enacts contemporary changes, and what its effects may be. What is gained by this approach is an 
understanding of how events are (re)composed as they become entangled with other events and 
conditions. It focuses attention on what an event is, how it happens, and how it changes as it is 
experienced as a set of figures, predictions, scenes, and objects entangled with other dimensions 
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